MPO-CZ

BGP inherited
Cluster stats
Netblocks10
Cluster ID210679200
RegistryRIPE
Customersfind customers using this network →
Evidence & provenance ?
Attribution BGP parent (inherited)
Shared handles clustered on 3 shared RIR contact/maintainer handles
Registry names 1 distinct registrant name across these blocks
full provenance (JSON) → · how attribution works

Footprint over time

5 weekly snapshots · JSON
10 0 netblocks since 2026-07-05
2026-07-05 peak 10 2026-07-19

IP Ranges (10)

⬇ export CSV
CIDR Org name Registry Status Confidence
62.84.152.144/30 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
62.209.212.188/32 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
193.86.67.128/27 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
193.86.240.40/29 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
193.179.2.64/29 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
193.179.2.72/29 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
194.213.201.200/29 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
2001:af0:8000:5700::/56 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED ● low
2001:af0:8002:308::/64 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED ● low
2001:af0:ffcb::/48 MPO-CZ RIPE ASSIGNED ● low

Possibly related to this organisation

what's this?
Sub-allocations under carriers
IP blocks an ISP reassigned to a similarly-named customer — decoded from the ISP's own naming convention, not a direct registration.
  • REMPO-CZ via T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. sub-allocation
  • PAMPO-CZ via T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. sub-allocation
  • PROIMPO-CZ via T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. sub-allocation

Network trust

what's this?
RPKI hygiene: A how networks compare →
100.0% of checked blocks have valid RPKI ROA coverage (10 of 10)
Possible discrepancies (2)

These blocks are registered to MPO-CZ but cryptographically authorized for a different, unrelated network (1 distinct holder) — often M&A history, multi-homing, or outsourced/managed hosting, occasionally worth a closer look.

2001:af0:ffcb::/48 /48 authorized for AS13036 — T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.
2001:af0:8000:5700::/56 /56 authorized for AS13036 — T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.

NIC Handles

DUMY-RIPE DUMY-RIPE GTSCZ-MNT