Koen De Wit

BGP inherited
Cluster stats
Netblocks9
Cluster ID210513471
RegistryBGP
Customersfind customers using this network →
Evidence & provenance ?
Attribution BGP parent (inherited)
Shared handles clustered on 12 shared RIR contact/maintainer handles
Registry names 5 distinct registrant names across these blocks
full provenance (JSON) → · how attribution works

Footprint over time

5 weekly snapshots · JSON
9 0 netblocks since 2026-07-05
2026-07-05 peak 9 2026-07-19

IP Ranges (9)

⬇ export CSV
CIDR Org name Registry Status Confidence
5.196.148.156/30 Koen Cornelissen RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● high
2a05:dfc1:858f::/48 Koen van der Stroom RIPE ASSIGNED ● high
2a10:2f00:109::/48 Koen De Wit BGP ANNOUNCED ● high
2a10:cc40:160::/48 Koen De Wit BGP ANNOUNCED ● high
2a10:2f00:109::/48 Koen De Wit RIPE ASSIGNED ● medium
2a10:cc40:160::/44 Koen De Wit RIPE ALLOCATED-BY-LIR ● medium
2a0e:b107:194::/49 Koen RIPE ASSIGNED ● low
2a0e:b107:194::/48 Koen De Wit RIPE ALLOCATED-BY-LIR ● low
2a0e:b107:194:8000::/49 Koen RIPE ASSIGNED ● low

Possibly related to this organisation

what's this?
Sub-allocations under carriers
IP blocks an ISP reassigned to a similarly-named customer — decoded from the ISP's own naming convention, not a direct registration.

Network trust

what's this?
RPKI hygiene: C how networks compare →
66.7% of checked blocks have valid RPKI ROA coverage (6 of 9)
Possible discrepancies (1)

These blocks are registered to Koen De Wit but cryptographically authorized for a different, unrelated network (1 distinct holder) — often M&A history, multi-homing, or outsourced/managed hosting, occasionally worth a closer look.

2a05:dfc1:858f::/48 /48 authorized for AS216455 — Sting Alleman

NIC Handles

AS207650 DUMY-RIPE DUMY-RIPE KOEN-MNT MNT-KDW MNT-KDW ORG-KA785-RIPE ORG-KOEN1-RIPE ORG-WR18-RIPE OVH-MNT SBMT STING-MNT