E-GOVERNMENT
BGP inherited
Cluster stats
| Netblocks | 4 · 780 IPv4 addresses |
| All fragments | 42 blocks across 7 clusters |
| Cluster ID | 209603549 |
| Registry | RIPE |
| Customers | find customers using this network → |
Evidence & provenance ?
| Attribution | BGP parent (inherited) |
| Shared handles | clustered on 3 shared RIR contact/maintainer handles |
| Registry names | 1 distinct registrant name across these blocks |
| full provenance (JSON) → · how attribution works | |
IP Ranges (4)
⬇ export CSV| CIDR | Org name | Registry | Status | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 78.39.26.0/24 | E-GOVERNMENT | RIPE | ASSIGNED PA | ● low |
| 78.39.28.0/24 | E-GOVERNMENT | RIPE | ASSIGNED PA | ● low |
| 78.39.29.0/24 | E-GOVERNMENT | RIPE | ASSIGNED PA | ● low |
| 78.39.101.192/28 | E-GOVERNMENT | RIPE | ASSIGNED PA | ● low |
Network trust
what's this?
RPKI hygiene: A
how networks compare →
100.0%
of checked blocks have valid RPKI ROA coverage
(4 of 4)
Possible discrepancies (3)
These blocks are registered to E-GOVERNMENT but cryptographically authorized for a different, unrelated network (1 distinct holder) — often M&A history, multi-homing, or outsourced/managed hosting, occasionally worth a closer look.
| 78.39.26.0/24 /24 | authorized for AS58224 — Iran Telecommunication Company PJS |
| 78.39.29.0/24 /24 | authorized for AS58224 — Iran Telecommunication Company PJS |
| 78.39.28.0/24 /24 | authorized for AS58224 — Iran Telecommunication Company PJS |
NIC Handles
AS12880-MNT
DUMY-RIPE
DUMY-RIPE