MEDCOM-NET

BGP inherited
Cluster stats
Netblocks10
Registered in Denmark (6) · Poland (3) · KZ (1)
All fragments 17 blocks across 6 clusters
Cluster ID208824763
RegistryRIPE
Customersfind customers using this network →
Evidence & provenance ?
Attribution BGP parent (inherited)
Shared handles clustered on 7 shared RIR contact/maintainer handles
Registry names 2 distinct registrant names across these blocks
full provenance (JSON) → · how attribution works

Footprint over time

5 weekly snapshots · JSON
10 0 netblocks since 2026-07-05
2026-07-05 peak 10 2026-07-19

IP Ranges (10)

⬇ export CSV
CIDR Org name Registry Status Confidence
77.243.51.128/28 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
77.243.58.8/29 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
80.63.52.64/29 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
80.197.59.0/26 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
87.54.121.64/26 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
87.61.111.128/29 MEDCOM-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
95.59.222.104/30 MEDCOM RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
195.116.28.240/29 MEDCOM RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
217.153.44.176/29 MEDCOM RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
217.153.44.184/30 MEDCOM RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low

Possibly related to this organisation

what's this?
Same name family
Separately-registered clusters whose names share “MEDCOM” — often per-country or per-system registrations of the same brand, occasionally a different organisation sharing the name. Not counted in this organisation's own footprint.
Sub-allocations under carriers
IP blocks an ISP reassigned to a similarly-named customer — decoded from the ISP's own naming convention, not a direct registration.

Network trust

what's this?
RPKI hygiene: A how networks compare →
100.0% of checked blocks have valid RPKI ROA coverage (10 of 10)
No discrepancies found among checked blocks.

NIC Handles

AS8246-MNT DUMY-RIPE DUMY-RIPE KNIC-MNT NETIC-MNT TDK-MNT TPNET