ACRON-NET

BGP inherited
Cluster stats
Netblocks9
Registered in Russia (5) · Czechia (1)
All fragments 17 blocks across 5 clusters
Cluster ID208857871
RegistryRIPE
Customersfind customers using this network →
Evidence & provenance ?
Attribution BGP parent (inherited)
Shared handles clustered on 7 shared RIR contact/maintainer handles
Registry names 3 distinct registrant names across these blocks
full provenance (JSON) → · how attribution works

Footprint over time

5 weekly snapshots · JSON
9 0 netblocks since 2026-07-05
2026-07-05 peak 9 2026-07-19

IP Ranges (9)

⬇ export CSV
CIDR Org name Registry Status Confidence
62.181.51.32/29 Acron RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
194.84.143.168/29 ACRON-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
195.151.44.0/29 ACRON-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
195.151.55.32/29 ACRON-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
212.67.81.232/29 ACRON-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
212.176.31.64/26 ACRON-NET RIPE ASSIGNED PA ● low
2a01:4f8:13a:159b::/64 ACRON RIPE ASSIGNED ● low
2a01:4f8:222:2614::/64 ACRON RIPE ASSIGNED ● low
2a01:4f8:252:1cc1::/64 ACRON RIPE ASSIGNED ● low

Possibly related to this organisation

what's this?
Same name family
Separately-registered clusters whose names share “ACRON” — often per-country or per-system registrations of the same brand, occasionally a different organisation sharing the name. Not counted in this organisation's own footprint.
Sub-allocations under carriers
IP blocks an ISP reassigned to a similarly-named customer — decoded from the ISP's own naming convention, not a direct registration.

Network trust

what's this?
RPKI hygiene: C how networks compare →
66.7% of checked blocks have valid RPKI ROA coverage (6 of 9)
No discrepancies found among checked blocks.

NIC Handles

AS12767-MNT DUMY-RIPE DUMY-RIPE EUT-MNT HOS-GUN ROSPRINT-NCC SEVEREN-MNT